Geometry of Fund Multiples vs Rates

When IRR\mathrm{IRR} solves tCFt(1+r)t=0\sum_t CF_t (1+r)^{-t}=0 but TVPI=NAV+DistPaid In\mathrm{TVPI}=\tfrac{NAV+\mathrm{Dist}}{\mathrm{Paid\ In}} tells another story.

8/31/2025

Multiples tell you how much. Rates tell you how fast. They live on different axes, and large samples make that difference visible. Same TVPI can sit next to very different IRRs depending on timing. That timing carves a shape in (TVPI,IRR)(\text{TVPI}, \text{IRR}) space, not a single curve [1].


Definitions and immediate consequences

Let Ct0C_t \ge 0 be contributions, Dt0D_t \ge 0 distributions, with terminal NAV NAVT0\text{NAV}_T \ge 0.

  • TVPI

    TVPI=t=0TDt+NAVTt=0TCt.\text{TVPI} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{T} D_t + \text{NAV}_T}{\sum_{t=0}^{T} C_t}.

    TVPI is a scale statistic.

  • IRR

    r solvest=0TCt+Dt(1+r)t+NAVT(1+r)T  =  0.r \ \text{solves} \quad \sum_{t=0}^{T} \frac{-C_t + D_t}{(1+r)^t} + \frac{\text{NAV}_T}{(1+r)^T} \;=\; 0.

    IRR is a rate that makes the discounted cash flow polynomial equal zero.

When they coincide. If all contributions occur at t=0t=0, all value comes back once at t=Tt=T, and NAVT=0\text{NAV}_T=0, then

C0+C0TVPI(1+r)T=01+r=TVPI1/T,-C_0 + \frac{C_0 \,\text{TVPI}}{(1+r)^T} = 0 \quad\Rightarrow\quad 1+r = \text{TVPI}^{1/T},

so rr equals the simple CAGR of TVPI [2]. Depart from that lump-sum timing and the two metrics separate.

Continuous-time view. With a signed measure dCF(t)=C(t)dt+dD(t)+NAVTδT(dt)d\text{CF}(t) = -C(t)\,dt + dD(t) + \text{NAV}_T \delta_T(dt),

0TertdCF(t)=0.\int_0^T e^{-rt}\, d\text{CF}(t) = 0.

IRR is a root of a Laplace transform of the cash-flow path [3]. Timing changes the transform, so it changes the root.


Controls

Toy timing slider baseline (0 early ... 1 late)

A toy slider: fix TVPI, move time

Fix TVPI and shift distributions earlier or later. IRR rises with earlier cash and falls with later cash, even though the wealth multiple is unchanged.

Headlines

TVPI (fixed): 1.50x

IRR: 7.88%

Avg distribution time: 6.50 of 10 years

The dotted vertical line marks the average distribution time. Sliding toward late shifts that line right, and IRR usually falls even though TVPI is held constant.

012345678910−40−200204060
ContributionsDistributionsToy cash flows at fixed TVPI, varying timingYearCash flow (units of commitment)

Key idea. At a given rr, earlier positive cash flows have larger present value because 1/(1+r)t1/(1+r)^t is decreasing and convex in tt [4]. To keep NPV at zero, rr must adjust.


Two solved examples (same TVPI, different IRR)

Assume C0=100C_0 = 100, TVPI=1.5\text{TVPI} = 1.5, NAVT=0\text{NAV}_T=0.

  • All-at-the-end (lower IRR bound for this horizon): DT=150D_T = 150.

    100+150(1+r)T=0  r=1.51/T1.-100 + \frac{150}{(1+r)^T} = 0 \ \Rightarrow\ r = 1.5^{1/T} - 1.

    For T=5T=5, r8.43%r \approx 8.43\%.

  • Split distributions earlier and later: D2.5=75D_{2.5} = 75, D5=75D_5 = 75. Let x=(1+r)2.5x = (1+r)^{-2.5} so (1+r)5=x2(1+r)^{-5} = x^2:

    100+75x+75x2=0  3x2+3x4=0  x=3+5760.7583.-100 + 75x + 75x^2 = 0 \ \Rightarrow\ 3x^2 + 3x - 4 = 0 \ \Rightarrow\ x = \frac{-3 + \sqrt{57}}{6} \approx 0.7583.

    Then (1+r)2.5=1/x1.3186(1+r)^{2.5} = 1/x \approx 1.3186 and 1+r1.11691+r \approx 1.1169, so r11.7%r \approx 11.7\%.

Same TVPI. Different timing. Different IRR. This is the geometry in miniature.


Useful bounds and sanity checks

Assume C0>0C_0>0, NAVT=0\text{NAV}_T=0, and distributions occur in [tmin,tmax][t_{\min}, t_{\max}] with 0<tmintmaxT0 < t_{\min} \le t_{\max} \le T.

  • Lower bound: Lumping all DtD_t at the latest date minimizes IRR:

    rTVPI1/tmax1.r \ge \text{TVPI}^{1/t_{\max}} - 1.
  • Upper bound: Lumping all DtD_t at the earliest date maximizes IRR:

    rTVPI1/tmin1.r \le \text{TVPI}^{1/t_{\min}} - 1.

    If tmin=0t_{\min}=0 and TVPI>1\text{TVPI}>1, the upper bound is unbounded, reflecting that arbitrarily early positive cash can drive IRR arbitrarily high absent constraints. Realistic capital cycles impose tmin>0t_{\min}>0.

  • Evenly spaced mm installments over [0,T][0,T] (contrib at t=0t=0): Set q=(1+r)T/mq = (1+r)^{-T/m}. With equal installments DjT/m=C0TVPI/mD_{jT/m} = C_0\,\text{TVPI}/m for j=1,,mj=1,\dots,m,

    TVPImj=1mqj=1TVPIq(1qm)m(1q)=1,\frac{\text{TVPI}}{m}\sum_{j=1}^{m} q^j = 1 \quad\Leftrightarrow\quad \text{TVPI}\cdot \frac{q(1-q^m)}{m(1-q)} = 1,

    which gives qq and hence rr by root-finding. As mm increases (holding TVPI and horizon fixed), IRR increases since more weight arrives earlier.


Sensitivity to timing (implicit function view)

Let

F(r,θ)  =  tCt+Dt+θ(1+r)t  +  NAVT(1+r)T.F(r,\theta) \;=\; \sum_{t} \frac{-C_t + D_{t+\theta}}{(1+r)^t} \;+\; \frac{\text{NAV}_T}{(1+r)^T}.

Here θ\theta shifts distributions later when it increases. At the IRR, F(r,θ)=0F(r,\theta)=0. By the implicit function theorem,

drdθ=F/θF/r.\frac{dr}{d\theta} = -\frac{\partial F/\partial \theta}{\partial F/\partial r}.

Since F/θ=tDt+θln(1+r)(1+r)t<0\partial F/\partial \theta = -\sum_t D_{t+\theta}\,\ln(1+r)\,(1+r)^{-t} < 0 and F/r<0\partial F/\partial r < 0, we get drdθ<0\frac{dr}{d\theta} < 0. Making distributions later reduces IRR. Making contributions later raises IRR by the same logic. This is the algebra beneath the slider [4].

A convenient one-parameter stretch of the distribution clock is DtDstD_t \mapsto D_{st} with s>1s>1 meaning “later.” Then F/s<0\partial F/\partial s < 0 and again dr/ds<0dr/ds<0.


Statistical view: p(IRRTVPI)p(\text{IRR} \mid \text{TVPI})

Simulate smooth capital schedules (e.g., Beta-shaped calls and dists) and condition on TVPI. You get a distribution of IRRs at each multiple, not a single value.

0.8–1.1x (n=417)1.1–1.3x (n=309)1.3–1.5x (n=326)1.5–1.7x (n=278)1.7–2.0x (n=322)2.0–2.4x (n=271)2.4–3.0x (n=243)0204060
0.8–1.1x (n=417)1.1–1.3x (n=309)1.3–1.5x (n=326)1.5–1.7x (n=278)1.7–2.0x (n=322)2.0–2.4x (n=271)2.4–3.0x (n=243)IRR distributions conditional on TVPI binsTVPI binIRR (annual, %)
  • Near TVPI ~ 1.0, timing noise dominates and rr spreads widely.
  • As TVPI rises, the spread narrows but remains a band, not a point.
  • The map (TVPIIRR)(\text{TVPI} \to \text{IRR}) is many-to-one. The shape matters [1].

The joint map in (TVPI,IRR)(\text{TVPI}, \text{IRR})

Estimate the joint geometry and color bins by average lateness of distributions.

123−40−200204060
00.20.40.60.81Avg lateness (0=early, 1=late)Geometry of TVPI vs IRR, shaded by average distribution latenessTVPI (x)IRR (annual, %)
  • At fixed TVPI (vertical slices), you see IRR bands. Darker color means later distributions and lower IRR.
  • Ridges tilt upward: larger multiples push IRR up, but the slope depends on timing, not just scale.

Subscription lines in one equation

For an LP facing delayed capital calls by Δ\Delta with line interest ii, a simple one-lump toy rewrites the equation as

C0(1+r)Δ  +  C0TVPI(1+r)T  =  0,- \frac{C_0}{(1+r)^{\Delta}} \;+\; \frac{C_0\,\text{TVPI}}{(1+r)^T} \;=\; 0,

ignoring line cost on the GP balance sheet. The reduced time-in-seat Δ\Delta raises the LP’s IRR relative to no line. If you include financing cost as a reduction in effective TVPI (or an added outflow), the lift is partially offset, but the timing effect remains [6].

Subscription line (contained demo)
11.522.5351015
BaselineWith sub lineBefore/After: sub line effect (small demo)TVPI (x)IRR (annual, %)

Baseline uses your current timing and a fixed toy TVPI. The sub line shifts LP calls later and adds interest cost. With "Hold TVPI constant", you see mostly a vertical move (time compression). Without it, TVPI dips a bit while IRR still tends to rise.


Concrete pair: fixed TVPI, diverging IRRs

Two stylized funds hit TVPI = 1.5 with different timing profiles.

Two funds, same TVPI = 1.5x, different IRRs

Each fund invests 100 in present‑value terms and returns 150. Fund A pays back earlier, Fund B later. IRR splits sharply despite identical TVPI.

MetricFund A (early)Fund B (late)
TVPI1.50x1.50x
IRR12.21%7.83%

You can replicate the effect with the slider above: pin TVPI, push distributions right, and watch IRR fall.

Read them as two points on the same vertical slice of the map. The gap is timing, not scale.


Caveats

  • NAV noise. Interim NAVs introduce estimation error into both metrics.
  • IRR pathologies. Multiple sign changes can yield multiple or no IRRs.
  • Model vs reality. Simulations use smooth shapes; real exits are lumpy with fees.

Wrap

Multiples summarize the scale of outcome. Rates summarize the pace of the path. Their relationship is not a function; it is a geometry shaped by time. Use both.


Notes

  1. Note [1]

    Think “band, not point.” Same TVPI can map to a range of IRRs because discounting is time-sensitive, so asking for a single IRR that corresponds to a multiple is ill-posed without timing constraints.

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  2. Note [2]

    When all capital goes in at t=0t=0 and comes out once at t=Tt=T, IRR equals TVPI1/T1\text{TVPI}^{1/T} - 1—the textbook compound annual growth rate.

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  3. Note [3]

    The IRR condition ertdCF(t)=0\int e^{-rt} d\text{CF}(t)=0 is the zero of a Laplace transform of the cash-flow measure; shifting cash timing changes the transform and moves the root.

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  4. Note [4]

    f(t)=(1+r)tf(t)=(1+r)^{-t} is decreasing and convex for r>1r>-1. Earlier positive dollars raise NPV more than later ones, so keeping NPV at zero forces rr to adjust upward. That convexity underlies the slider intuition.

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  5. Note [5]

    Copula language separates marginal behavior (distributions of TVPI and IRR) from dependence, explaining why conditioning on TVPI yields a distribution of IRR rather than a single value.

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  6. Note [6]

    Subscription lines shorten LP time-in-seat and typically lift IRR for a given deal path. Financing costs reduce effective TVPI, partially offsetting that lift; the net effect is empirical.

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